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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
v. : 
ROBERT KELTON BERRY, : Case No. 20040142-CA 
Defendant/Appellant : 
INTRODUCTION 
On August 30, 2004, Appellant filed his opening brief which contained the 
statement of the case, facts, and summary of the arguments. See Appellant's 
Opening Brief. On June 14, 2005, this Court ordered supplemental briefing in this 
case addressing any effect the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Reyes, 
2005 UT 33 (Reyes II), issued on June 7, 2005, had in this matter. As requested 
by the Court, Appellant does not address any issues not affected by the Reyes II 
opinion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. STATE V. REYES DID NOT AFFECT THE ISSUE OF 
WHETHER REVERSAL IS REQUIRED WHERE DEFENSE 
COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR MISSTATING THE LAW ON 
REASONABLE DOUBT . 
In Reyes, the supreme court addressed the issues of whether the jury must 
be instructed that to return a guilty verdict it must "obviate all reasonable doubt" 
and whether a trial court must repeat the jury instructions at the close of the 
evidence. See Reyes IL 2005 UT 33 at Tfl. However, Reyes II did not address 
whether reversal is required when trial counsel violates the prohibition against 
describing "a reasonable doubt [a]s one which 'would govern or control a person 
in the more weighty affairs of life '" State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1232 
(Utah 1997) (citation omitted) overruled in part by Reyes IL 2005 UT 33. 
Therefore, Appellant's issue regarding defense counsel's ineffectiveness in 
equating a reasonable doubt to major life decisions is unaffected by Reyes II. 
A. State v. Reyes Only Addressed Two of the Three-Part Robertson 
Test. 
In State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, 84 P.3d (Reyes I), this Court held in part 
"that the reasonable doubt instruction given the jury in Mr. Reyes's trial failed the 
first and third Robertson elements, and it accordingly remanded for a new trial." 
Reyes II, 2005 UT 33 at f 8 (citing Reyes I, 2004 UT App 8 at ffi[21-22). The 
Robertson test required the following: 
First, "the instruction should specifically state that the State's proof 
must obviate all reasonable doubt." Second, the instruction should 
not state that a reasonable doubt is one which "would govern or 
control a person in the more weighty affairs of life," as such an 
instruction tends to trivialize the decision of whether to convict. 
Third, "it is inappropriate to instruct that a reasonable doubt is not 
merely a possibility," although it is permissible to instruct that a 
"fanciful or wholly speculative possibility ought not to defeat proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Reyes II, 2005 UT 33 at f7 (quoting Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1232 (citations 
omitted)). 
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This Court also held "that the trial court erred when it did not repeat the 
preliminary jury instructions at the close of the evidence." Reyes II, 2005 UT 33 
at TJ9 (citing Reyes I, 2004 UT App 8 at 1124). Therefore, on certiorari the supreme 
court addressed only whether a trial court violates "'due process and jury trial 
rights'" when the court's reasonable doubt jury instruction does not "utilize the 
specific language from Robertson requiring the State to 'obviate all reasonable 
doubt,' 'erroneously stated that reasonable doubt is . . . not doubt which is merely 
possible'" and whether Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17 (g) (6) and due 
process were violated by the trial court's failure to reread the preliminary jury 
instructions at the close of the evidence. Reyes II, 2005 UT 33 at f^5. 
First, the supreme court addressed the Robertson requirement that a trial 
court must instruct a jury "that the State's proof must 'obviate all reasonable 
doubt.'" Id at ^[25. The court discussed that the '"obviate all reasonable doubt' 
test" originated from Justice Stewart's dissent in State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 
1380-82 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Id The court reasoned that the 
'"obviate all reasonable doubt' concept appears to derive from a fear that in 
ascertaining the conviction of the truth of a charge against a defendant, a juror 
might misapply the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard unless she is required to 
search out, confront, and defeat reasonable doubt with evidence." Id The court 
found the concept of Justice Stewart's "suggestion that the jury be instructed to 
'obviate all reasonable doubt'" "both linguistically opaque and conceptually 
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suspect" because "not every jury will confront evidence in its deliberations 
sufficient to create a reasonable doubt." Id at [^26. 
The court also found the concept flawed because "it tends to diminish the 
degree of proof necessary to convict" and in that regard violates the standard set 
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 
(1994). Because "'the obviate all reasonable doubt' element of the Robertson test 
carries with it the substantial risk of causing a juror to find guilt based on a degree 
of proof below beyond a reasonable doubt," the court "expressly abandoned] it." 
Reyes II, 2005 UT 33 at 1J30. 
Next, the court addressed whether the jury instruction violated the third 
element of the Robertson test by 'erroneously stat[ing] that reasonable doubt is . . . 
not doubt which is merely possible.' Reyes II, 2005 UT 33 at [^5. The court 
pointed out that "neither Justice Stewart's dissent in Ireland nor the Robertson test 
it spawned outlawed all references to 'possibilities' in defining reasonable doubt." 
Id at [^32. The court determined that "[w]hen complemented by appropriate 
qualifying and explanatory language, the use of the term 'mere possibility' in the 
definition of doubt does not create a reasonable likelihood that the jury would 
apply an unconstitutionally diminished standard of proof." IdL at ^33. The court 
determined that the jury instruction in Reyes excluding doubt which is "'merely 
possible'" from consideration, was proper because it was "followed by an 
explanatory phrase "effectively neutraliz[ing] the risk that the reference" would 
"improperly lead a juror to apply a standard of proof lesser than beyond a 
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reasonable doubt." Id The court concluded that the instruction "appropriately 
addressed the concept of 'possibility' in gauging the reasonableness of doubt." Id. 
at 134. 
After suggesting a jury instruction on reasonable doubt for use by the trial 
courts in Utah, the court addressed whether this Court was correct in determining 
that it was harmless error for the trial court to fail to reinstruct the jury at the close 
of the evidence. Affirming on different grounds, the supreme court determined 
from the totality of the circumstances surrounding the trial court's recitation of the 
jury instructions, that the trial court complied with Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 17 (g) (6), therefore, there was no error. Id at ^ 42. 
Referring to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 19, the court concluded that 
"[t]he paramount goal that guides the timing of the recitation of an instruction is 
jury comprehension." Id. at ^47. The court reasoned that the common objective 
of Rule 19 was jury comprehension and the "the means chosen to pursue [that] end 
. . . is a grant of expanded flexibility in the content of jury instructions and the 
timing of their recitation to the jury." Id. at ^48. Given the impossibility of 
harmonizing Rule 19's "pragmatic tone" "with a hidebound interpretation of Rule 
17," the court declined to do so. Id The court concluded that given that "less than 
twenty-four hours separated the trial court's reading of the preliminary instructions 
from the conclusion of evidence" and that "the jury was provided with a written 
copy of every instruction," the trial judge was "within the bounds of discretion 
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afforded by rule 17 and rule 19" to decline to repeat the jury instructions at the 
close of the evidence. Id at [^49. 
Based on the court's conclusions, it "abandoned] Robertson's insistence 
that the jury be instructed that to return a guilty verdict it must "'obviate all 
reasonable doubts,'" and reversed this Court's holding in Reyes I on that point and 
affirmed, on alternative grounds, this Court's holding regarding the "challenge to 
the timing of the jury instructions." Id. at ^50. 
Because the court's opinion only addressed the first and third element of 
the Robertson test and only "expressly abandoned]" the first element requiring 
jury instruction to inform jurors that the State must "obviate all reasonable doubt," 
and the timing of jury instructions issue, Reyes II does not impact on Appellant's 
issue requiring this Court to reverse due to defense counsel's deficient 
performance in comparing reasonable doubt to major life decisions.1 Id. at ^[30. 
B. Defense Counsel Was Ineffective for Comparing a Reasonable 
Doubt to Major Life Decisions. 
Because Reyes II did not address the second element of the Robertson test 
requiring that jurors not be instructed that "a reasonable doubt is one which 
'would govern or control a person in the more weighty affairs of life,'" it does not 
1
 The supreme court recently issued State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, wherein it states 
that in Reyes II it had overruled the Robertson test. Id. at Tf21. However, as noted 
supra, the Reyes II opinion never directly addressed the second element of the 
Robertson test. See generally Reyes II, 2005 UT 33. Similarly, the supreme court 
in stating that the Robertson test was overruled did so without addressing the 
second element of the test in Cruz. See Cruz, 2005 UT 45. Therefore, the court's 
statement is dictum and does not affect Mr. Berry's ineffective assistance claim 
issue. 
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affect Appellant's ineffective assistance claim issue. Reyes IL 2005 UT 33. As 
argued in Appellant's opening brief, defense counsel was ineffective for 
misstating the law on reasonable doubt to the jury by erroneously comparing a 
reasonable doubt to major life decisions. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees 
defendants "the right to . . . have Assistance of counsel for his defense." State v. 
Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). This right has been held to mean the 
"effective assistance of counsel." Id. Utah appellate courts rely on the test 
established in Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the 
Stickland test, 'a defendant must show (1) that counsel's 
performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard 
of reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient 
performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 
trial would have been different" . . . . [I]n making this evaluation, the 
court must "indulge in the strong presumption that counsel's conduct 
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that 
is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that under the 
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial 
strategy." 
State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, TJ23, 84 P.3d 1183 (citations omitted). 
"To prevail on the first prong of the test, a defendant 'must identify specific 
acts or omissions demonstrating that counsel's representation failed to meet an 
objective standard of reasonableness.'" Robertson, 932 P.2d at }^24 (citation 
omitted). The second element in the Robertson test states that a reasonable doubt 
instruction to the jury "should not state that a reasonable doubt is one which 
'would govern or control a person in the more weighty affairs of life," as such an 
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instruction tends to trivialize the decision of whether to convict. Id. at 1232 
(quoting State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380-82 (Stewart, J., dissent)). This well 
established law was not at addressed in Reyes, but case law supports that it 
remains valid. 
In Justice Stewart's dissent in Ireland, he discusses how comparing a 
reasonable doubt to weighty decision in a jurors life "tends to diminish and 
trivialize the constitutionally required burden-of-proof standard." Ireland, 773 
P.2datl381. 
Nothing that one ordinarily does in the course of a normal life span 
is comparable to the decision to deprive another of either his or her 
life or liberty by voting to convict for a crime. Profound differences 
exist between decisions to convict another person and decision to 
enter into marriage, by a home, invest money, have a child, or have a 
medical operation - or whatever else might be deemed a weighty 
affair of life. 
The mental process employed in deciding that someone has 
committed a crime beyond a reasonable doubt is different from the 
mental process employed in making decisions in the "more weighty 
affairs of life." In making the latter type decision, a person looks 
forward and makes a decision about future conduct. A degree of risk 
is always inherent in such a decision, and usually the degree of risk 
based on doubt about future events is significant. The process 
employed in making such decisions is only partly a matter of 
assessment of past facts; instead, the decision often rests on a degree 
of hope, determination, and frequently, personal resolve. In most 
cases, the decision is revocable, but whether or not revocable, it is at 
least salvageable. 
A decision to convict always looks backward; it is concerned only 
about resolving conflicting versions of factual propositions about a 
past event. It is always irrevocable as to the jurors. The process 
does not involve the decision maker's hope, determination, or 
willingness to undertake a personal risk. Rather, such a decision 
demands reason, impartiality, and common sense. A jury must have 
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a greater assurance of the correctness of its decision, if it is to 
comply with the constitutional mandate, than the individual jurors 
are likely to have in making the "weighty" decisions they confront in 
their own lives. 
Id; see also Scurry v. United States, 347 F.2d 468, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ("[T]here 
is a substantial difference between a juror's verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt and a person making a judgment in a matter of personal importance to 
him.5'); Commonwealth v. Rembiszewski, 461 N.E.2d 201, 204-09 & n.l (Mass. 
1984) (finding error based on instruction including comparisons to decisions 
regarding professions, marriage, the home, and surgery). 
The concern over this type of "willing to act" analogy has been criticized 
by the United States Supreme Court. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 141 
(1954) (critizing "willingness to act" language in preference for "hesitate to act" 
language). While the majority of the Supreme Court has expressed a preference 
for the "hesitate to act" language, Justice Ginsburg identified concerns with this 
type of language also. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 24 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring). Urging for the adoption of the Federal Judicial Center's Pattern 
Criminal Jury Instruction 21, Justice Ginsburg quoted a judicial report to the 
Judicial Conference of the United States which criticizing the "hesitate to act" 
language to point out its problems. 
"[T]he analogy it uses seems misplaced. In the decisions people 
make in the most important of their own affairs, resolution of 
conflicts about past events does not usually play a major role. 
Indeed, decisions we make in the most important affairs of our lives 
- choosing a spouse, a job, a place to live, and the like - generally 
involve a very heavy element of uncertainty and risk-taking. They 
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are wholly unlike the decisions jurors ought to make in criminal 
cases." 
Id. (quoting Federal Judicial Center, Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions 18-
19 (1987) (commentary on instruction 21)). 
The reasonable doubt instruction urged by Justice Ginsburg for adoption is 
the very one our supreme court recommended to our state trial court's for use 
because it "winnow[s] out ill-conceived notions of reasonable doubt." Reyes II, 
2005UT33atlf36. 
As determined by case law, comparing a reasonable doubt to major life 
decisions "tends to diminish and trivialize the constitutionally required burden-of-
proof standard." Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1381. Due process requires the state to 
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and when a reasonable doubt is defined to 
a jury in a way that leads them to convict on a lower burden-of-proof standard, due 
process is violated. See Victor, 511 U.S. at 22. In fact, in analyzing the first 
element of the Robertson test, the supreme court's focus was on whether the jury 
instruction "tends to diminish the degree of proof necessary to convict." Reyes II, 
2005UT33atT[27. 
In this case, defense counsel described a reasonable doubt to the jury during 
closing arguments by using the following analogy: 
And I have talked about how serious these offenses are, and how 
important, if not more important, than deciding who you are going to 
marry or if you are going to buy a house. That's how careful you 
have to be and what factors you would weigh in saying, "Am I going 
to marry this person?" And the thing is, in a case like that, with 
buying a house or marrying somebody, you can change that 
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decision. You can get a divorce. You can sell your house. But in 
this case you cannot. 
R. 267:294. 
As argued above, the prohibition of using such analogies to describe 
reasonable doubt continues to be recognized. See Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1232; 
State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1380-82 (Stewart, J., dissent); Scurry v. United 
States, 347 F2d 468, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1965). In violating this prohibition against 
comparing reasonable doubt to major life decisions, defense counsel's 
performance fell "below an objective standard of reasonableness." Montoya, 2004 
UT 5 at f23. Given the well established case law that the use of these types of 
analogies tends to diminish the standard of proof necessary to convict, defense 
counsel's comparisons cannot be considered sound trial strategy. Id. Therefore, 
defense counsel's performance meets the first prong of the Strickland test. 
"[B]ut for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability 
that the outcome of the trial would have been different." Id. This was a close case 
where Appellant's participation in the aggravated robbery was suspect due to Mr. 
Booth's, the complainant, inconsistent testimony regarding many aspects of what 
happened during the incident. See Appellant's Opening Brief. For example, 
crucial testimony regarding who took what property during the robbery, Mr. Booth 
initially testified at the preliminary hearing that after the passenger in the vehicle, 
Appellant's brother, pulled out a knife and said "What do you got?" Mr. Booth 
gave him "[his] CD player, [his] CD's, everything I had on me, my wallet." R. 
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263:9. Later, upon the prosecutor's suggestion of Appellant's involvement, Mr. 
Booth testified that the Appellant, the driver, had taken his CD's, and his brother 
took the rest. R. 263:12. Mr. Booth also testified during cross-examination that 
he was holding his CD's and they were not in the car. R. 263:14-15. 
Defense counsel: You were holding [the CD's], and the driver 
took them from you? 
Mr. Booth: No, the passenger took them. 
Defense counsel: The passenger did? OK. So then the driver 
didn't take anything from you? 
Mr. Booth: He took the CD's. 
Defense counsel: You just said the passenger took the CD's. Are 
you not sure. 
Mr. Booth: I am not sure. I am not sure if they were in the 
car or not. 
R. 263:15. 
On redirect, the prosecutor asked Mr. Booth to take his time and think 
about who took what property. R. 263:25. Mr. Booth then testified that "[t]he 
passenger took my CD player and my razor. And I heard the driver say, "T am 
keeping these,' and took my CD's." R. 263:25. At the first trial, Mr. Booth 
testified that Appellant was looking through the CD case and said that he was 
keeping them. R. 265:38. At the second trial, Mr. Booth again testified that he 
gave Appellant's brother "all [his] stuff. . . [his] CD's, [his] radio, [his] wallet, 
everything [he] had." R. 266:99. 
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Prosecutor: You gave all those items to the defendant's younger 
brother? 
Mr. Booth: No, not all of them. I gave my CD's and my wallet to 
him. 
Prosecutor: Your CD's? 
Mr. Booth: No, my CD player and my wallet. And then I don't 
remember where my CD's were. I think they were in 
the car. 
R. 266:99. 
Mr. Booth then stated that Appellant had taken his CD's. R. 266:99. 
Specifically, Mr. Booth testified that after Appellant's brother had hit him and 
pulled a knife on him and asked for his property, the brother then told Appellant to 
give Mr. Booth back his CD's. R. 266:100. However, Appellant allegedly said 
that he was keeping them. R. 266:100, 134. This testimony, along with several 
other inconsistent statements made by Mr. Booth, made it suspect. Because of 
these and other conflicting statements, instructing the jury on the State's correct 
burden of proof was crucial. 
Defense counsel by using prohibited analogies in describing a reasonable 
doubt "diminished or trivialized" the burden of proof and led the jury to believe it 
could convict on a lesser standard then required by due process. Because 
u[n]othing that one ordinarily does in the course of a normal life span is 
comparable to the decision to deprive another of either his or her life or liberty by 
voting to convict for a crime," defense counsel's statements mislead the jury and 
resulted in prejudice to the Appellant. Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1380-82. In a case 
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such as this where the jury must rely solely on the victim's testimony to determine 
guilt, misstating the law on the standard required to convict resulted in Appellant 
receiving ineffective assistance of counsel. The prejudice suffered by Appellant 
required that this Court reverse his conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant, Robert Kelton Berry, respectfully requests this Court to reverse 
his conviction and remand for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this S^_ day of August, 2005. 
<<( fV 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
Attorney for Appellant 
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